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I shall always be a flower girl to Professor Higgins because he
always treats me as a flower girl and always will; but I know I
can be a lady to you because you always treat me as a lady and
always will.
—Eliza Doolittle, in Pygmalion by George Bernard Shaw
1 Introduction
People (pupils, subordinates, and so on) tend to act in accordance with the
expectation of others (teachers, managers, and so on). In particular, the for-
mer may, to some degree, internalize the higher expectations placed on them
by the latter, and then act in ways to fulfill those expectations. A pioneering
work by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) shows, through their experimental
research, that a teacher’s expectation for a pupil’s intellectual competence
can come to serve as an educational self-fulfilling prophecy, and names this
phenomenon the Pygmalion effect after Greek myths.1 Livingston (1969)
discusses the Pygmalion effect in managerial setting.2 He argues that a
number of case studies and experiments reveal the following:
(a) “What managers expect of subordinates and the way they treat them
largely determine their performance and career progress.”
(b) “A unique characteristic of superior managers is the ability to create
high performance expectations that subordinates fulfill.”
(c) “Less effective managers fail to develop similar expectations, and as a
consequence, the productivity of their subordinates suffers.”
1A series of research by Rosenthal and his collaborators studies the Pygmalion effect
in educational setting. Jussim (1986) provides a theoretical model of the Pygmalion effect
in the classroom.
2See also Goddard (1985).
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(d) “Subordinates, more often than not, appear to do what they believe
they are expected to do.”
Since Livingston (1969), many researchers have been studying the Pyg-
malion effect in business or military organizations. Kierein and Gold (2000)
and McNatt (2000) conduct meta-analysis of relevant studies within man-
agement contexts, and both find that the Pygmalion effect is in general fairly
strong.
From these existing studies, we can summarize the way the Pygmalion
effect occurs as follows:
1. A manager’s high expectation influences her attitude toward her sub-
ordinates.
2. Such attitude has positive effects on subordinates’ self-expectancy.
3. The subordinates’ enhanced self-expectancy then improves their per-
formance.
The last part of this process, that a person’s enhanced self-expectation im-
proves his own performance, is often called the Galatea effect. For example,
Kierein and Gold (2000) explain the Galatea effect as one of other types
of expectation effects: “The Galatea effect occurs not when the leader has
expectations of subordinates, but when subordinates’ raised expectations of
themselves are realized in their higher performance.” They however state
that it is part of the Pygmalion effect, and examine the Pygmalion and
Galatea effects together in their meta-analysis.3
In this paper we attempt to formalize and explain both the Pygmalion
and the Galatea effects. To this purpose, we extend a simple but standard
3On the other hand, McNatt (2000) seems to emphasize that the feature that a man-
ager’s expectation has the impact on her subordinate’s self-expectancy appears uniquely
in the Pygmalion effect.
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model of a principal and an agent with moral hazard and limited liability.
A key extension from this standard model is that the agent has reference-
dependent preferences (henceforth RDP). What a person has RDP means
that his preferences are conditional on a reference point, and various anoma-
lies such as loss aversion, endowment effects, status quo bias, and so on, are
consistent with RDP.4 More precisely, the payoff depends on the realized
consumption as gain or loss relative to a reference level. What serves as
the reference point is thus crucial to the model with RDP. In this respect,
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Sagi (2004) as well as most experimental
research assume that the status quo serves as the reference point, and Sug-
den (2003) considers the reference point as one’s current endowment which
is determined by a “reference lottery.” Note that in these studies reference
points are exogenously given.
Our model is built on a yet another model of RDP by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2004), which has the following three important features.5 First, it combines
the standard consumption payoff that is independent of the reference level,
with the reference-dependent gain-loss payoff that depends solely and in a
“universal” way on consumption payoff relative to the reference level. Sec-
ond, a person’s reference point is her recent expectation, represented by a
probability measure, over outcomes.6 Third, the model by Ko˝szegi and Ra-
bin (2004) has a prominent feature that the reference point is endogenously
determined by the person’s rational expectation.7 To this end, they define
the personal equilibrium which requires that a person maximize his payoff
4The seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explores issues on RDP. Re-
cently, various models of RDP have been developed. For example, Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005), Sagi (2004), and Sugden (2003) give axiomatic foundations for models of RDP.
5We give a brief sketch of their model in the next section.
6In this sense, their model is similar to that of Sugden (2003).
7Munro and Sugden (2003) and Falk and Knell (2004) also study the endogenous
determination of reference points.
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given his rational expectations about outcomes, and hence the expectations
themselves depend on his own anticipated behavior. These features of their
model allow us to introduce the reference-dependent nature of human de-
cisions into standard economic problems, a principal-agent problem in this
paper.8
Following their model, we suppose that the agent’s utility depends not
only on his material payoff, as in the standard model, but also on the gain-
loss payoff which is defined by the agent’s evaluation of his consumption
bundle as gains or losses relative to a reference point. The reference point of
the agent is his expectation about the effort level chosen by the agent and
the resulting success probability of the project. We then define the personal
equilibrium that determines the agent’s reference point endogenously. Our
main contribution is to analyze interaction between RDP and incentives
designed by the principal. We first take a contract as given, and analyze the
agent’s personal equilibrium. We show that compared with the standard
model without RDP, the agent’s higher expectation enables the principal
to implement high effort with lower-powered incentives. We also show that
when the power of incentives is intermediate, multiple equilibria may exist.
In this case the agent’s expectations are self-fulfilling: he chooses high effort
if he expects to do so, while he chooses low effort if it is his expected effort.
We then study the optimal contract solving the principal’s problem. The
principal’s contract affects the agent’s personal equilibrium and hence his
expectations. Furthermore, the principal wants to make the agent attend
to high effort in the region with multiple equilibria. Analysis of optimal
contracts depends on how the agent forms his expectation in this region.
8Our work is thus in the spirit of one of the goals of their paper. “In addition to
the ways we believe our model substantially clarifies and improves on existing theories
of reference-dependent preferences, it also has an attractive “methodological” feature in
promoting the addition of reference dependence to existing economic models. (p.6)”
5
We thus explicitly distinguish among the following two cases: 1) the agent
chooses the personal equilibrium he prefers; and 2) the agent forms his expec-
tation consistent to his inherent type where we call the agent with a higher
expectation optimistic type and one with a lower expectation pessimistic
type. We mainly study the second case by analyzing various contractual
arrangements that are different concerning how the principal deals with the
pessimistic type.
Based on the analysis of our principal-agent model, we formalize the
Pygmalion and Galatea effects. Since the literature on these effects mainly
focuses on effects of the subjects’ abilities under given incentive schemes,
we restate our results in terms of a measure of the agent’s ability, which is
observable to both the principal and the agent. In addition, we incorporate
the principal’s expectation explicitly into the agent’s preference such that
he cares about not only the gain and loss relative to his own expectation
(as before) but also the principal’s payoff relative to her expectation. We
show that high effort is a personal equilibrium if the agent’s ability is suffi-
ciently high. Thus if the agent expects he can succeed with sufficiently high
probability, then he actually succeeds with the same high probability. We
interpret this as the Galatea effect: The agent’s self-expectation about his
performance determines his actual performance. Concerning the Pygmalion
effect, the higher is the principal’s expectation, the lower is the threshold
ability level above which the agent tends to choose high effort as his per-
sonal equilibrium. Moreover, the higher principal’s expectation generates
the possibility that the pessimistic agents who had been in the region of
multiple equilibria move to the high effort unique equilibrium region and
are hence willing to choose high effort. Furthermore, the optimistic agents
who had been in the region where the low effort was the unique equilibrium
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come to belong to the multiple equilibrium region and are then willing to
choose high effort as the personal equilibrium.
Although we are unaware of any economic literature studying the Pyg-
malion effect, there are possible alternative approaches to explaining this
effect. First, there is a simple explanation that the principal with high ex-
pectation takes some explicit actions to improve the agent’s productivity.
This is nothing but the theory of human capital. In contrast to this expla-
nation, we consider the situation where the principal’s expectation implicitly
influences the agent’s performance through his own expectation formation
process. In other words, our model does not have any component which
directly affects the agent’s productivity. Future experimental work should
test whether or not a mere expectation of high performance is fulfilled.
The second, more interesting approach is to focus on the role of in-
formation transmission by the principal. We do not consider the issue on
asymmetric information in this paper, by assuming that information con-
cerning the agent’s ability is symmetric. However, the principal with high
expectation may effectively transmit her private information on the agent’s
productivity when the agent does not know his own productivity.9 Be´nabou
and Tirole (2003) is an example along this line.10 In their model, the prin-
cipal’s policy (wage scheme) as a signal informs the agent of his ability and
then affects his action: costly signal from the principal serves as a moti-
vational device for the agent. However, we think this kind of explanation
is not a whole story for the following two respects. First, the Pygmalion
effect works even when agents know their own abilities without such in-
formative signals. An experimental result illustrated in Livingston (1969)
9Note that the principal’s mere expression of her expectation is not credible to the
agent, since it is just cheap talk.
10See also Hermalin (1998).
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shows this point. At an office of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
a manager decided to group his insurance agents according to their abilities,
which fact was known symmetrically among agents. Then, the performance
of the agents in the top group improved dramatically, and that of those in
the lowest unit declined. However, the performance of those in the average
group also improved significantly, due to the supervisor’s high expectation.
This observation is consistent with our results. Second, Be´nabou and Ti-
role (2003) assume that the agent devotes more effort when he receives a
good signal that convinces him that his ability is high. That is, the Galatea
effect is exogenously given. In our model, in contrast to this signaling ap-
proach, there is no information transmission, and both the Galatea and the
Pygmalion effects are explained endogenously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the
model of RDP based on Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004). In section 3 we build
a simple agency model with RDP, and analyze the personal equilibrium
and the optimal incentive scheme in section 4. In section 5, we explicitly
consider the role of the principal’s expectation and relate our results with
the Pygmalion and Galatea effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Reference-Dependent Preferences
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004), we formulate the reference-dependent
nature of preferences in the following way. Let c = (c1, . . . , cn) be a con-
sumption bundle of an agent, and r = (r1, . . . , rn) be a reference consump-
tion bundle. How reference point r is determined will be explained in the
next section. We define the agent’s overall payoff u(c | r) by
u(c | r) = v(c) + z(c | r) =
n∑
k=1
vk(ck) +
n∑
k=1
zk(ck | rk), (1)
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where v(c) is his material payoff, as in standard models, and z(c | r) rep-
resents the agent’s evaluation of his consumption bundle as gain and loss
relative to a reference point. We call this part of the agent’s payoff as gain-
loss payoff. (1) implies that each dimension of consumption is assumed to
be additively separable.
The model is extended to cases in which there is uncertainty in con-
sumption outcomes as well as reference points. Let F be the probability
distribution function of consumption bundle c, and G be the distribution
function of reference point r. The agent’s payoff is then given by
U(F | G) =
∫
c
∫
r
u(c | r)dG(r)dF (c).
This formulation means that the agent compares a given outcome c with all
r in the support of the reference lottery.11 For example, suppose that the
reference lottery is between −$100 and $200 with equal probability. If the
actual outcome is $0, then he expects to feel a gain relative to −$100 and a
loss relative to $200, with equal probability.
As Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) do, we further assume that each dimension
is evaluated by the same “universal” gain-loss function µ(·) of the difference
of consumption from the reference level, evaluated by material payoff:
z(c | r) =
n∑
k=1
µ(vk(ck)− vk(rk)) (2)
The gain-loss function µ(·) is assumed to have the following properties.
They capture important features of how people evaluate gain and loss from
the reference point.
A0 µ(0) = 0 and µ′(y) > 0.
A1 µ′′(y) ≤ 0 for y > 0, and µ′(y) > 0 and µ′′(y) ≥ 0 for y < 0.
11In Sugden (2003), an outcome is compared only to the outcome that would have
resulted from the reference lottery in the same state.
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A2 If y > y′ > 0, µ(y)− µ(y′) < µ(−y′)− µ(−y) holds.
A3 limy↑0 µ′(y)/ limy↓0 µ′(y) ≡ λ > 1.
A1 represents diminishing sensitivity, implying that as the consumption level
moves further away from the reference level, the marginal valuation of gains
and losses decreases. And A2 and A3 capture loss aversion, A2 for “large”
stakes and A3 for marginal ones.
In what follows we assume away diminishing sensitivity and isolate the
effect of loss aversion, by assuming µ(·) is linear, and define
µ(vk(ck)− vk(rk)) =
{
α(vk(ck)− vk(rk)) if vk(ck)− vk(rk) > 0,
αλ(vk(ck)− vk(rk)) if vk(ck)− vk(rk) < 0,
(3)
where α, a positive constant, is the weight on the gain-loss payoff, and λ > 1
is the “coefficient of loss aversion” which is the same as λ defined in A3.
3 A Simple Agency Model with RDP
There are two parties, a principal and an agent. The agent engages in one
project on behalf of the principal. The outcome of the project is either
success (s) or failure (f), and the probability distribution depends on the
agent’s effort. We assume there are two feasible effort levels e0 and e1,
and denote by pi the probability of success under effort ei.12 We assume
0 < p0 < p1 < 1 and denote ∆p ≡ p1 − p0.
In the standard agency model, the agent’s payoff depends on his “con-
sumption” bundle (w, ei) where w is remuneration received from the princi-
pal. Let v(w, ei) be his material payoff function, and assume it is additively
separable: v(w, ei) = w − di where di is the agent’s private cost of effort
ei. For simplicity we assume d0 = 0 < d1, and denote d = d1. Using the
12The analysis can be extended to the case where the effort variable is continuous.
10
formulation introduced in section 2, we extend this standard model as fol-
lows. Let (w, ej) be a reference point, and define the agent’s overall payoff
u(w, ei | w, ej) by
u(w, ei | w, ej) = w − di + µ(w − w) + µ(dj − di) (4)
where the gain-loss function µ(·) is defined by (3).
The agent’s effort is unobservable to the principal, while the outcome of
the project is verifiable. The principal can thus design an incentive compen-
sation scheme (bs, bf ) where bi is remuneration paid from the principal to
the agent when outcome is i ∈ {s, f}. We assume that bi must satisfy the
limited liability constraint bi ≥ 0. We also denote the difference in payment
by ∆b = bs − bf .
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The principal offers a contract.
2. The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If he rejects it, the
game ends and each of the parties receives the reservation payoff zero.
If the agent accepts the contract, the game moves to the next stage.
3. The reference point of the agent is determined.
4. The agent chooses effort.
5. The outcome of the project realizes and the payment is made according
to the contract.
We now discuss how the agent’s reference point is determined. First, we
follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) by taking the standpoint that the refer-
ence point is determined by the agent’s recent expectations about what he
is going to get. In most literature, the reference point of an individual is
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given exogenously as his current or past endowments, while little is known
both theoretically and empirically concerning how the reference point is de-
termined. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) argue that expectations play a central
role in determining reference points. For example, they state as follows.
“While existing experimental evidence is generally interpreted in terms of
the reference point being the endowment or status quo, we feel that virtually
all of this evidence can also be interpreted in terms of expectations—for the
simple reason that in the contexts studied people plausibly expect to keep
the status quo. (p.3)” Expectations seem to play a central role in determin-
ing reference points even when endowments do not. For example, workers
are averse to wage cut not because it reduces their status quo level of wealth
but because they expect to receive lower wages. People tend to feel a loss if
they expect to buy a good and find it is sold out at the shop. Since we study
the effects of expectations on performance, their formulation in particular
fits well with our research agenda.
If we adopt the expectation-as-reference view and apply it to our agent,
the agent’s preferences depend on his expectations, which themselves de-
pend on his preferences. The agent with some predictive ability will take
this feedback into account, and reach a state in which his expectations are
consistent with his eventual outcomes. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004),
we thus model the agent’s decision making in terms of an “equilibrium” as
follows.
Suppose that a compensation scheme (bs, bf ) has been accepted by the
agent. The agent’s reference point consists of effort ej he is expected to
choose, and the resulting probability distribution over (bs, bf ), which is rep-
resented by the probability of success pj .13 Then (ej , pj) is a personal equi-
13Since pj is uniquely determined by ej , it is enough to define reference points and
equilibria in terms of effort only. We however include the probability distribution in order
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librium if for i 6= j,
U(ej , pj | ej , pj) ≥ U(ei, pi | ej , pj) (5)
where U(·) is the agent’s expected payoff and is given by
U(ei, pi | ej , pj) = bf + pi∆b − di
+ pi(1− pj)µ(∆b) + (1− pi)pjµ(−∆b)
+ µ(dj − di).
(6)
The first line of (6) is the expected material payoff. The second and third
lines represent the gain-loss payoff under reference point (ej , pj). For ex-
ample, suppose that the reference point is (e1, p1), and the agent’s choice is
(e0, p0). The agent enjoys gain αd (corresponding to the third line) because
he saves cost d by not choosing e1 which he was expecting to choose by
spending cost d. If the agent succeeds, he enjoys gain α∆b with probabil-
ity 1 − p1 because he was expecting to fail with this probability. Similarly,
when the agent actually fails, he suffers from loss αλ∆b with probability p1
since he was expecting to succeed with this probability. These gain and loss
correspond to the second line.
Note that the crucial feature behind the agent’s preferences is that there
is time lag between the stage when the agent forms expectations (stage 3 in
the timing of the game) and the stage when the agent chooses effort (stage
4) or when uncertainty is resolved (stage 5): The agent’s preferences do not
change immediately at stage 4 or 5, and hence he compares his effort and
income with what he expected them to be at stage 3.
The definition of the personal equilibrium states that if the agent’s ref-
erence point is the expectation to choose ej and hence to succeed with
probability pj , then he should indeed be willing to choose ej . The reference
to emphasize the existence of gains and losses in terms of outcome-dependent payments.
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point is thus determined endogenously by the agent, anticipating his choice,
and then given the reference point, the agent chooses effort consistent with
his expectation.
4 Analysis
In this section, we study the agent’s personal equilibrium and the optimal
contract. In subsection 4.1, we first find the personal equilibrium and then
examine its characteristics. In subsection 4.2, we derive the optimal con-
tract.
4.1 The Agent’s Personal Equilibrium
Suppose that the principal offers a contract (bs, bf ), which is accepted by
the agent. Given the contract, we analyze the agent’s personal equilibrium.
In the next subsection, we analyze the optimal contract.
There are two candidates for personal equilibria, (e1, p1) and (e0, p0).14
First consider (e1, p1). The relevant expected payoffs are calculated as fol-
lows:
U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) = bf + p1∆b − d+ p1(1− p1)α∆b − (1− p1)p1αλ∆b
U(e0, p0 | e1, p1) = bf + p0∆b + αd+ p0(1− p1)α∆b − (1− p0)p1αλ∆b
Pair (e1, p1) is a personal equilibrium if U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) ≥ U(e0, p0 | e1, p1),
or
∆b ≥ β1 ≡ d∆p
1 + α
1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1) (PE1)
14A mixed-strategy equilibrium also exists when both (e1, p1) and (e0, p0) are equilibria.
However, the agent’s expected payoff under the mixed-strategy equilibrium is lower than
the expected payoff under one of two pure-strategy equilibria, and hence we focus on pure
strategies.
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Next consider (e0, p0). The following expected payoffs are relevant.
U(e0, p0 | e0, p0) = bf + p0∆b + p0(1− p0)α∆b − (1− p0)p0αλ∆b
U(e1, p1 | e0, p0) = bf + p1∆b − d− αλd+ p1(1− p0)α∆b − (1− p1)p0αλ∆b
Then (e0, p0) is a personal equilibrium if U(e0, p0 | e0, p0) ≥ U(e1, p1 | e0, p0),
or
∆b ≤ β0 ≡ d∆p
1 + αλ
1 + α+ αp0(λ− 1) (PE0)
It is easy to show the following results.
Proposition 1. (i) β0 > d/∆p > β1. (ii) When contract (bs, bf ) is given,
there are three ranges of “incentive intensity” ∆b that characterize personal
equilibria.
(a) If ∆b > β0, then (e1, p1) is the only personal equilibrium.
(b) If ∆b < β1, then (e0, p0) is the only personal equilibrium.
(c) If β1 ≤ ∆b ≤ β0, both (e0, p0) and (e1, p1) are personal equilibria.
To understand the results, consider first the standard agency model in
which the agent does not exhibit RDP (corresponding to α = 0 in our
model). The agent then prefers to choose e1 if ∆b > d/∆p, and choose e0
if ∆b < d/∆p. Proposition 1 (i) then implies that the agent with RDP,
when he expects to choose e1, actually chooses e1 for incentive intensity
∆b lower than d/∆p, the critical value under the standard case. And the
agent, expecting to choose e0, actually chooses e0 for ∆b higher than d/∆p.
In other words, there are additional incentives from the agent’s reference
dependence or more specifically, loss aversion.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 (i) can be understood as follows. First consider
result d/∆p > β1. RDP introduce the following positive incentive effects. If
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the agent, expecting the outcome to be success with probability p1,chooses
e1 instead of e0, then the chance of “gain” increases from p0(1 − p1) to
p1(1− p1), and that of “loss” decreases from (1− p0)p1 to (1− p1)p1. These
effects reinforce the incentive to choose e1 via incentive pay. On the other
hand, there is a negative effect from RDP. When the agent’s reference effort
is e1, shirking (e0) benefits the agent by saving the cost of effort. This effect
is represented by αd. The positive effects dominate because of λ > 1, the
agent’s loss aversion.
The intuition behind β0 > d/∆p is similar. When the agent’s reference
point is (e0, p0), e1 is more attractive under RDP than without RDP, because
gain (loss) is more (less, respectively) likely. However, the agent is more
reluctant to choose e1 because he experiences loss αλd. This latter negative
effect dominates because of loss aversion, and thereby the agent chooses e0
even though incentives strong enough to induce e1 are provided for the agent
without RDP.
Figure 1 illustrates three ranges of ∆b in Proposition 1 (ii). In regions
∆b > β0 and ∆b < β1, the agent’s preferences exhibit a status quo bias,
in the sense that if the agent with a reference point (ej , pj) wants to select
(ei, pi), he prefers (ei, pi) when it is his reference point.15 In the interme-
diate range, there are multiple personal equilibria. In this range, the agent
expecting to choose e1 actually do so in order to reduce the probability of
loss from the failure of the project, while he chooses e0 to avoid loss due to
unexpected disutility of effort, if e0 is his expected effort.
The next proposition reports some comparative statics results.
Proposition 2.
(a) β0 is increasing in α and λ, and decreasing in p1.
15This result is a special case of Proposition 1 in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004).
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Figure 1: Personal Equilibria and Incentive Intensity
∆b
β1 β0d/∆p
(e1, p1)
(e0, p0)
(b) β1 is decreasing in α, λ and p1.
(c) β0 − β1 is increasing in α, λ and decreasing in p1.
Proof. Results (a) and (b) directly follow from the definitions in (PE0) and
(PE1). For (c), the comparative statics results for α and λ are immediate
from (a) and (b). By differentiating β0 and β1 by p1, we obtain
∂β0
∂p1
− ∂β1
∂p1
= − d
∆2p
(
1 + αλ
1 + α+ αp0(λ− 1) −
1 + α
1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1)
)
+
d
∆p
α(λ− 1)(1 + α)
(1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1))2
≤ − d
∆2p
α(λ− 1)
1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1) +
d
∆p
α(λ− 1)(1 + α)
(1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1))2
≤ − d
∆p
α(λ− 1)
(1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1))2 (1 + α+ αp1(λ− 1)− (1 + α))
< 0
As the agent’s preferences are more reference-dependent or more averse
to losses, both (e1, p1) and (e0, p0) are personal equilibria for broader ranges
of incentive intensity, and hence the region where multiple equilibria exist
also enlarges. A more interesting exercise is to examine the effect of p1,
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which we can interpret as a parameter representing the agent’s ability.16
Higher effort e1 becomes more attractive to the agent because of higher
success probability by choosing e1. This first effect works to reduce both β0
and β1 while it affects β0 more than β1 because β0 > β1. For (e1, p1), there
is an additional second effect of increasing p1 via the reference point itself:
Higher p1 raises the probability of the reference being success (and hence
the probability of loss), as well as reduces the probability of the reference
being failure (and hence the probability of gain). Because of loss aversion,
the former change dominates, which change in turn increases the marginal
benefit from higher p1. The additional effect thus also works to reduce β1.
However, this additional effect is not large enough to upset the smaller first
effect on β1 than on β0. The region where there are multiple equilibria
therefore becomes smaller as the agent has a higher ability.
4.2 The Optimal Contract
Now consider the principal’s problem of solving the optimal contract. We
suppose the benefit of success to the principal is so large that she wants
to implement effort e1 with least costs. Later in this subsection we take
the benefit into consideration as well. The principal’s problem is then to
minimize the expected payment bf+p1∆b subject to the agent’s participation
constraint
U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) ≥ u¯, (PC)
and a condition that the agent chooses (e1, p1) as a personal equilibrium,
which we call the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (IC). (PC) im-
16More generally, let η be a parameter representing the agent’s innate ability. The
success probabilities p0 and p1 both depend on η, and assume the success probabilities are
increasing in η: p′i(η) > 0 for i = 0, 1. Furthermore, assume that pi(η) exhibits strictly
increasing differences in (i, η): p′1(η) − p′0(η) > 0. In other words, ability and effort are
complementary. We can then prove the results similar to those in Proposition 2: β0, β1,
and β1 − β0 are decreasing in η.
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plies that after observing the principal’s offer, the agent anticipates his refer-
ence point and effort choice. We assume that the agent’s reservation payoff
is positive (u¯ > 0): If u¯ = 0, we need to take care of some boundary cases
that complicate the analysis a bit. However, the results do not essentially
change.
The principal faces a problem of multiple equilibria, but suppose for
a moment that ∆b can implement (e1, p1) as a personal equilibrium. For
example, if the principal sets ∆b a little above β0, then she can guarantee
the agent to play (e1, p1) since it is the only personal equilibrium.
Given such a ∆b, the principal wants to minimize the expected payment.
By (PC), the expected payment is bounded from below:
bf + p1∆b ≥ d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)∆b. (7)
(7) is satisfied at bf = 0 when
∆b ≥ d+ u¯
p1
1
1− (1− p1)α(λ− 1) (8)
holds.17 The optimal contract is then (bs, bf ) = (∆b, 0) and the principal’s
expected payment is p1∆b. On the other hand, if (7) does not hold under
bf = 0, bf is determined by the condition such that the inequality in (7)
is replaced by equality. The principal’s expected payment is then equal
to the right-hand side of (7). Note that the principal’s expected payment
is increasing in ∆b: If (7) does not bind, the agent earns rent, which is
increasing in ∆b; and if (7) binds, the principal’s expected payment is equal
to the right-hand side of (7), which is increasing in ∆b.
We now study optimal contracts by explicitly analyzing the problem of
multiple equilibria. Analysis depends on how the agent forms his expec-
17Throughout this subsection we assume α ≤ 1 and λ ≈ 2 so as to satisfy 1 − (1 −
p1)α(λ− 1) > 0.
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tation, facing multiple personal equilibria. We can think of two possible
assumptions.
1) The agent chooses the personal equilibrium he prefers.
2) The agent forms his expectation consistent to his inherent type: The
pessimistic type chooses (e0, p0) while the optimistic type chooses
(e1, p1).
If we adopt the first assumption, the principal has virtually no role,
except contract choice, in forming the agent’s expectation, although the
principal can still implement (e1, p1), possibly with ∆b lower than β0, under
some conditions.18
In the rest of this subsection, we study the principal’s optimal contract
under the second assumption. We assume that the principal cannot distin-
guish between two types, and the proportion of the pessimistic (optimistic)
agents is q > 0 (respectively 1− q > 0). We focus on contracts that induce
at least the optimistic type to choose e1. We further assume p0 = 0 in order
to simplify the analysis, so that ∆p = p1.
We study three kinds of contractual arrangements that are different con-
cerning how the principal deals with the pessimistic type: (a) uniquely imple-
mentable contracts; (b) screening contracts; and (c) non-screening contracts.
Uniquely implementable (UI) contracts induce not only the optimistic
type but also the pessimistic type to choose e1. The principal then must set
∆b a little above β0 so that (e1, p1) becomes the unique personal equilibrium.
By (8), the optimal UI contract is (bs, bf ) ≈ (β0, 0) if
β0 >
d+ u¯
p1
1
1− (1− p1)α(λ− 1)
18Later in section 5 we will explicitly incorporate the principal’s expectation into our
model in order to explain the Pygmalion effect more convincingly. There we will provide
a condition for the agent’s preferred equilibrium to be (e1, p1).
20
holds. Substituting β0 = (d/∆p)(1 + αλ)/(1 + α+ αp0(λ− 1)) and p0 = 0,
and solving for p1 yield the following condition:
p1 >
D + αλ
1 + αλ
, (9)
where D ≡ (1 + α)u¯/(α(λ − 1)d). If (9) hold, then the optimal UI contact
is (bs, bf ) ≈ (β0, 0) and the principal’s expected payment is approximately
p1β0. If (9) does not hold, (PC) must bind at optimum, and the principal’s
expected payment is approximately equal to the right-hand side of (7) with
∆b = β0. In summary, the expected payment under the optimal UI contract
is approximately equal to cUI defined as follows:
cUI =
{
p1β0 if p1 > (D + αλ)/(1 + αλ),
d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)β0 otherwise.
The second kind of contracts, screening contracts, induces only the op-
timistic agent to participate. For this aim, we have to impose the following
additional condition, screening condition, to the principal’s optimization
problem:
u¯ > U(e0, p0 | e0, p0). (SC)
A necessary condition for (PC) and (SC) to hold is that the optimistic agent
earn a higher expected payoff than the pessimistic agent:
U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) > U(e0, p0 | e0, p0)
⇒ ∆b > d
p1
1
1− (1− p1)α(λ− 1) ≡ βˆ (10)
This βˆ is the lowest bound for ∆b when the principal designs a contract
screening out the pessimistic agent. Note that βˆ > β1 always holds, while
βˆ < β0 holds if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
p1 >
αλ
1 + αλ
. (11)
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Since u¯ > 0, (8) does not hold at ∆b ≈ βˆ and hence (PC) binds and
condition (SC) holds at the optimal screening contract with ∆b ≈ βˆ. The
principal’s expected payment is then approximately equal to
cS = (1− q){d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)βˆ}.
Under the third kind, non-screening contracts, the principal attempts
to reduce the incentive intensity all the way down to β1, and not only the
optimistic agent but also the pessimistic agent participates. Since β1 < βˆ,
U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) < U(e0, p0 | e0, p0) holds at ∆b = β1. It is also easy
to find that (8) does not hold at ∆b = β1, and hence at the optimal non-
screening contract with ∆b = β1, the participation constraint (PC) binds for
the optimistic agent and the principal’s expected payment to the optimistic
type is equal to d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)β1.
However, the principal also has to pay for the pessimistic agent under
the non-screening contract. Note that U(e0, p0 | e0, p0) > u¯ since (PC) for
the optimistic type is binding (U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) = u¯) and U(e1, p1 | e1, p1) <
U(e0, p0 | e0, p0). This implies that the participation constraint for the
pessimistic agent does not bind at optimum, and the principal’s payment is
equal to bf = d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)β1− p1β1. The principal’s expected
payment is hence equal to
cNS = d+ u¯+ p1(1− p1)α(λ− 1)β1 − qp1β1
= d+ u¯+ p1[(1− p1)α(λ− 1)− q]β1
We now compare three kinds of contracts and derive the optimal con-
tract. The following proposition compares the principal’s expected payments
among three contracts. The proof is provided in appendix.
Proposition 3. (a) If p1 > αλ/(1 + αλ), then there exists q˜ ∈ (0, 1) such
that
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(a1) cS < cNS < cUI if q > q˜;
(a2) cNS < cS < cUI if q < q˜.
(b) If p1 ≤ αλ/(1 + αλ), then there exists q˜ and q¯ satisfying 0 ≤ q¯ < q˜ < 1
such that
(b1) cS < cNS < cUI if q > q˜;
(b2) cNS < cS < cUI if q¯ < q < q˜;
(b3) cNS < cUI < cS if q < q¯.
Proposition 3 implies that the lowest expected payment be attained ei-
ther at the optimal screening contract or the optimal non-screening con-
tract. The UI contract is costly because it induces both types of the agents
to choose e1 as a personal equilibrium, and hence must compensate for
their loss aversion. It also must leave some rents to both types if p1 >
(D + αλ)/(1 + αλ).
The comparison between cS and cNS depends on the proportion of the
pessimistic type q. First note that both cS and cNS are decreasing in q: cS is
decreasing in q because the agent is more likely to be screened out; and cNS
is decreasing in q since the expected payment to the pessimistic type is lower
than that to the optimistic type. However, the pessimistic type earns rents
under the optimal non-screening contract, while the optimistic type is paid
more under the optimal screening contract because of the higher incentive
intensity. The expected payment is hence lower under the screening contract
than under the non-screening contract for q sufficiently high.
We have so far ignored the benefit of success. Now suppose the benefit
is B > 0 if the project succeeds, while it is zero if the project fails. The
comparison between the optimal screening contract and the optimal non-
screening contract does not change since under either contract, the expected
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benefit to the principal is (1 − q)p1B. However, the optimal UI contract
has an advantage since both types are induced to choose e1 and hence the
expected benefit is p1B. The optimal contract depends on the magnitude
of B. If it is sufficiently large, the UI contract is optimal. If B is small,
then either the screening contract or the non-screening contract is optimal,
following the conditions in Proposition 3.
5 The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects
Based on the analysis in the previous section, we formalize the Pygmalion
and Galatea effects. While our formulation in the previous sections naturally
explains the Galatea effect, the principal’s expectation, which is crucial in
the Pygmalion effect, plays no role there. We hence modify our model in
order to incorporate the expectation of the principal explicitly. Suppose
that the principal expects the agent to devote effort eˆ and succeed with
probability pˆ. For simplicity we assume (eˆ, pˆ) belong to {(e0, p0), (e1, p1)}.
The agent, after observing the principal’s expectation, forms his expectation
and chooses effort in a personal equilibrium. When the agent’s expectation
is (ej , pj) and his actual effort is (ei, pi), his expected payoff is given as
follows.
U(ei, pi | (ej , pj), (eˆ, pˆ)) =bf + pi∆b − d
+ pi(1− pj)α∆b − (1− pi)pjαλ∆b
+ pi(1− pˆ)αp∆B − (1− pi)pˆαpλ∆B
(12)
The agent cares about not only the gain and loss relative to his own expecta-
tion (as before) but also the principal’s payoff relative to her expectation.19
With probability pi(1− pˆ), the agent succeeds in the project while the prin-
19This formulation on caring about the principal’s payoff is related to “let-down aversion
(or guilt aversion)” which captures that the agent’s aversion to inflict loss on the principal.
See, for example, Dufwenberg and Gu¨th (2004) or Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
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cipal expected him to fail, and hence enjoys “gain” ∆B = B − 0 > 0 from
fulfilling her expectation. However, with probability (1−pi)pˆ the project fails
though it was expected to succeed by the principal. In this case, the agent
feels “loss” from disappointing the principal. Parameter αp > 0 measures
the extent of the agent’s concern about satisfying the principal’s expectation.
Since the literature on this theme mainly focuses on effects of the sub-
jects’ abilities under given incentive schemes, we hereafter assume that
∆b > 0 is given and the participation constraint is satisfied. We also con-
tinue to make a simplifying assumption p0 = 0, and study how personal
equilibria change with the agent’s ability measured by p1.
As before, there are two candidates for personal equilibria. First consider
(e1, p1). The relevant expected payoffs are calculated as follows:
U(e1, p1 | (e1, p1), (eˆ, pˆ)) =bf + p1∆b − d
+ p1(1− p1)α∆b − (1− p1)p1αλ∆b
+ p1(1− pˆ)αp∆B − (1− p1)pˆαpλ∆B
U(e0, p0 | (e1, p1), (eˆ, pˆ)) =bf + p0∆b + αd
+ p0(1− p1)α∆b − (1− p0)p1αλ∆b
+ p0(1− pˆ)αp∆B − (1− p0)pˆαpλ∆B
Pair (e1, p1) is a personal equilibrium if U(e1, p1 | (e1, p1), (eˆ, pˆ)) ≥ U(e0, p0 |
(e1, p1), (eˆ, pˆ)), or
p1[{1 + α+ α(λ− 1)p1}∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B] ≥ (1 + α)d. (PE1a)
Defining by pi1 the probability p1 that satisfies (PE1a) with equality, we
can show that pi1 has the following properties:
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(i) pi1 > 0,
(ii) pi1 < 1 if ∆b > 1+α1+αλd− αp{1+(λ−1)pˆ}∆B1+αλ , and
(iii) if p1 ≥ pi1, then (e1, p1) is a personal equilibrium.
Next consider (e0, p0). The following expected payoffs are relevant.
U(e0, p0 | (e0, p0), (eˆ, pˆ)) =bf + p0∆b
+ p0(1− p0)α∆b − (1− p0)p0αλ∆b
+ p0(1− pˆ)αp∆B − (1− p0)pˆαpλ∆B
U(e1, p1 | (e0, p0), (eˆ, pˆ)) =bf + p1∆b − d− αλd
+ p1(1− p0)α∆b − (1− p1)p0αλ∆b
+ p1(1− pˆ)αp∆B − (1− p1)pˆαpλ∆B
Then (e0, p0) is a personal equilibrium if U(e0, p0 | (e0, p0), (eˆ, pˆ)) ≥ U(e1, p1 |
(e0, p0), (eˆ, pˆ)), or
p1[(1 + α)∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B] ≤ (1 + αλ)d. (PE0a)
Denoting by pi0 the probability p1 satisfying (PE0a) with equality, we
can also show that pi0 has the following properties:
(i) pi0 > 0,
(ii) pi0 < 1 if ∆b > 1+αλ1+α d− αp{1+(λ−1)pˆ}∆B1+α , and
(iii) if p1 ≤ pi0, then (e0, p0) is a personal equilibrium.
We can show that pi0 > pi1 by substituting pi0 into (PE1a). We then
identify three ranges of p1 when ∆b > 1+αλ1+α d− αp{1+(λ−1)pˆ}∆B1+α (see Figure 2
where we denote personal equilibria only by effort level): (e1, p1) is a personal
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equilibrium in region pi1 ≤ p1 while (e0, p0) is a personal equilibrium in region
p1 ≤ pi0. There exist multiple equilibria in region pi1 ≤ p1 ≤ pi0. The formal
results are summarized as the following proposition.
Figure 2: Personal Equilibria and the Agent’s Ability
pi1 pi0
e1
e0
p1
10
Proposition 4. When incentive intensity ∆b is given, there are three ranges
of p1 that characterize personal equilibria.
(a) If p1 > pi0, then (e1, p1) is the only personal equilibrium. This region
exists if ∆b > 1+αλ1+α d− αp{1+(λ−1)pˆ}∆B1+α .
(b) If p1 < pi1, then (e0, p0) is the only personal equilibrium. This region
always exists.
(c) If pi1 ≤ p1 ≤ pi0, then both (e0, p0) and (e1, p1) are personal equilibria.
This region always exists.
Our formulation naturally explains the Galatea effect, one type of “self-
fulfilling prophecy” which means that the agent’s self-expectation about his
performance determines his actual performance: If the agent thinks he can
succeed with high probability, then he can actually succeed with the same
high probability. More precisely, Proposition 4 states that the Galatea effect
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prevails if the agent’s ability is sufficiently high (p1 ≥ pi1). On the other
hand, if the agent’s ability is low enough (p1 < pi1), high expectation is not
consistent to his actual choice, and hence no Galatea effect works.20
The Pygmalion effect, on the other hand, involves the principal. In our
formulation, the principal’s expectation affects the agent’s personal equilib-
rium through his concern about the principal’s payoff. The following propo-
sition summarizes the effects of the principal’s expectation on the threshold
ability levels pi0 and pi1.
Proposition 5.
(a) pi0 is decreasing in pˆ and αp.
(b) pi1 is decreasing in pˆ and αp.
(c) pi0 − pi1 is decreasing in pˆ and αp
Proof. We define the function F 1(pii, pˆ) ( F 0(pii, pˆ)) when (PE1a) (respec-
tively (PE0a)) holds with equality as follows.
F 1(pi1, pˆ) = pi1[{1 + α+ α(λ− 1)pi1}∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B]− (1 + α)d = 0
F 0(pi0, pˆ) = pi0[(1 + α)∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B]− (1 + αλ)d = 0
By implicit function theorem,
dpi1
dpˆ
= − F
1
pˆ
F 1pi1
= − αp(λ− 1)∆Bpi1
2α(λ− 1)∆Bpi1 + [(1 + α)∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B] < 0
and
dpi0
dpˆ
= − F
0
pˆ
F 0pi0
= − αp(λ− 1)∆Bpi0
(1 + α)∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B < 0,
20One could instead say the Golem effect exists in this case. The Golem effect is the
Pygmalion effect in a negative direction: The Golem effect works when the low expectation
induces low performance.
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where F ix ≡ ∂F i/∂x (x = pi0, pi1, and pˆ). In addition, we can easily show
that |dpi0/dpˆ| > |dpi1/dpˆ| since λ > 1 and pi0 > pi1. This implies that pi0−pi1
is decreasing in pˆ. In terms of αp, we can prove the results of Proposition 5
in the similar way.
As the principal’s expectation is higher or the agent cares more about
the principal’s expectation, (a) the region of (e1, p1) being the unique per-
sonal equilibrium enlarges, (b) (e0, p0) is the unique personal equilibrium
for a narrower range of p1, and (c) the region where multiple equilibria exist
shrinks. These results suggest that the higher the principal’s expectation
is, the more likely the agent is to expect himself to succeed with high prob-
ability, and his expectation is to be fulfilled. To state the effects of the
principal’s expectation more precisely, however, we have to make an explicit
assumption about how the agent forms his expectation facing multiple per-
sonal equilibria. In subsection 4.2, we have shown two assumptions: 1) the
agent chooses the personal equilibrium he prefers; and 2) the agent forms
his expectation which is consistent with his inherent type.
If we adopt the first assumption, the agent consciously chooses his pre-
ferred equilibrium. The agent’s payoff difference is calculated as follows.
U(e1, p1 | (e1, p1), (eˆ, pˆ))− U(e0, p0 | (e0, p0), (eˆ, pˆ))
= p1[1− α(λ− 1) + α(λ− 1)p1]∆b + p1αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B − d.
(13)
Let us define pˆi as the probability p1 that satisfies (13) with equality.
If the agent’s ability is sufficiently small (p1 < pˆi), then the agent always
prefers (e0, p0) to (e1, p1) in the region with multiple equilibria, and hence the
principal’s expectation to make the agent attend to (e1, p1) is not effective.
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On the other hand, if p1 is high enough (p1 ≥ pˆi), (e1, p1) is the agent’s
preferred equilibrium. We can thus say that the Pygmalion effect works
if pˆi is smaller as the principal’s expectation (pˆ) is higher. The following
proposition confirms the Pygmalion effect actually works.
Proposition 6. pˆi is decreasing in pˆ.
Proof. By definition of pˆi, the following equation holds.
pˆi[1− α(λ− 1) + α(λ− 1)pˆi]∆b + pˆiαp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B − d = 0. (14)
Note that pˆi is a function of pˆ, we find the dpˆi/dpˆ as follows.
dpˆi
dpˆ
= − αp(λ− 1)∆Bpˆi{1 + α(λ− 1)}∆b + αp{1 + (λ− 1)pˆ}∆B < 0. (15)
As a result, pˆi is decreasing in pˆ.
The agent prefers the personal equilibrium (e1, p1) to (e0, p0) if p1 ≥
pˆi, and this condition is more likely to hold as the principal has a higher
expectation. The reason is that while increasing the principal’s expectation
reduces the probability of gain and raises that of loss, the latter change
dominates due to loss aversion, and this negative effect is smaller when the
agent actually chooses e1 than he chooses e0. The Pygmalion effect hence
works under the first assumption.
The second assumption is that the agent forms his expectation which
is consistent with his inherent type: The pessimistic type chooses (e0, p0)
while the optimistic type chooses (e1, p1), facing multiple equilibria. As in
subsection 4.2, consider three types of contracts (uniquely implementable
(UI), screening (S), and non-screening (NS)). We can show that the princi-
pal’s high expectation generates the possibility that both types of the agents
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are more likely to choose (e1, p1). First, as the expectation of the principal
is higher, the upper bound of the region of the multiple personal equilibria
(pi0) decreases (Proposition 5 (a)). Then those agents who had been in the
multiple equilibria region now belong to the region of the unique equilibrium
(e1, p1). Therefore more agents (both optimistic and pessimistic) are willing
to sign the UI contract, and the pessimistic agents who were not participat-
ing under the S contract or were choosing (e0, p0) under the NS contract are
now eager to choose (e1, p1).
Next, as the principal’s expectation is higher, the lower bound of the
multiple personal equilibria region (pi1) also decreases (Proposition 5 (b)).
The optimistic agents who had be in the region of the unique equilibrium
(e0, p0) hence move to the multiple equilibria region, and choose (e1, p1)
instead of (e0, p0). These are the optimistic agents who were not participat-
ing under the S contract and were choosing (e0, p0) under the NS contract.
(e1, p1) is hence more likely as the principal’s expectation is higher.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we introduce RDP into an agency model to study interaction
between reference dependence and incentives, and apply the results to both
the Pygmalion and Galatea effects. We first show that the agent’s higher ex-
pectation enables the principal to implement high effort with lower-powered
incentives than when the agent does not exhibit RDP. Our agent evaluates
his future choice based on his expectation as a reference point. The agent
with higher self-expectation is thus going to perform better. We interpret
this as the Galatea effect. We also show that when the agent’s ability is in-
termediate, multiple equilibria exist. The principal wants to make the agent
attend to high effort in the region with multiple equilibria, and we interpret
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the Pygmalion effect as an equilibrium selection device.
In this paper, we have explained the Pygmalion and Galatea effects under
the assumption that both the principal and the agent know the agent’s abil-
ity. One could alternatively study the Pygmalion effect under the condition
that only the principal knows the true ability of the agent. The Pygmalion
effect is then an effect of communication. The principal prefers to tell the
agent that his ability is high, if the agent believes it. As mentioned in the
introduction, the main issue of this alternative explanation is then how the
principal can make her announcement credible, and we could analyze the
problem in a fashion similar to Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Hermalin
(1998). If we incorporate this kind of communication issue into our formu-
lation, we conjecture we are able to strengthen the positive effects of the
principal’s expectation, and hence our results on the Pygmalion effect.
Although we believe expectations play a crucial role in determining ref-
erence points, there are other plausible reference points. Status quo and
endowments are obviously important determinants in many cases. Another
interpretation of reference points is based on the goal setting theory in social
psychology (Locke and Latham, 2002). The goal setting theory shows that
goals enhance performance by affecting reference points (see also Falk and
Knell (2004) and Heath et al. (1999)).
It is easy to modify our model such that the reference point is the goal
set by the principal. We can then show that the principal prefers to choose
the highest effort level and success probability as the reference point, pro-
vided that the agent participates (Daido and Itoh, in progress). Choosing
such a point maximizes the agent’s feeling of loss when he shirks (choosing
e0), and hence enables the agent to choose e1 by the lowest incentive ∆b.21
21On the other hand, Proposition 1 of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004) shows that the agent
prefers the lowest reference point.
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The principal might even suggest the agent be able to succeed with proba-
bility one, although such a point is inconsistent with the actual probability
distribution.
This line of research may also be helpful to explain the Pygmalion effect.
However, the reference point as the goal set by the principal does not always
align with the agent’s expectation which must be consistent with eventual
outcomes. We believe that the agent plays a more active role in determining
his reference point through his expectations.
As we have seen in the introduction, much research in social psychology,
management, and so on, including laboratory and field studies, shows that
the Pygmalion effect is significant. By contrast, there exists little economic
research on the Pygmalion effect as far as we know. However, we believe
that the Pygmalion effect also brings rich economic implications. We hope
our paper stimulates future economic research, especially experimental one,
on the Pygmalion effect, or more generally, self-fulfilling prophecy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
We first compare cS and cNS . We have cS < cNS if and only if
p1A(βˆ − β1) < q(d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β1)
where A ≡ (1 − p1)α(λ − 1) < 1. The terms in the parentheses in the
right-hand side are positive since
d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β1 > d+ u¯− p1(1−A)β1 > 0.
The first inequality comes from βˆ > β1, and the second inequality holds
because (8) does not hold at ∆b = β1, and hence
d+ u¯ > p1(1−A)β1. (A1)
We thus obtain cS < cNS if and only if
q > q˜ ≡ p1A(βˆ − β1)
d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β1
(A2)
holds. The difference between the denominator and the numerator is calcu-
lated as
(d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β1)− p1A(βˆ − β1) = d+ u¯− p1(1−A)β1 > 0
by (A1), and hence 0 < q˜ < 1 is satisfied.
We next compare cUI with cNS . First, suppose p1 > (D+ αλ)/(1 + αλ)
and hence
p1(1−A)β0 > d+ u¯. (A3)
Then by β0 > β1 and (A3),
cUI − cNS = qp1β1 − (d+ u¯+ p1Aβ1 − p1β0)
> qp1β1 − (d+ u¯− p1(1−A)β0) > 0.
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Next suppose p1 ≤ (D + αλ)/(1 + αλ). Then
cUI − cNS = qp1β1 + p1A(β0 − β1) > 0.
The expected payment is thus always smaller under the optimal non-screening
contract than under the optimal UI contract.
Finally, we compare cS and cUI . Suppose first p1 > (D + αλ)/(1 + αλ)
Then cS < cUI if and only if
q >
d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β0
d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ
holds. However, the numerator of the right-hand side is negative by βˆ < β0
and (A3). Hence cS < cUI always holds.
Next suppose p1 ≤ (D + αλ)/(1 + αλ). Then cS < cUI if and only if
q > q¯ ≡ p1A(βˆ − β0)
d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ
holds. Note that q¯ > 0 if βˆ > β0, and the sign of q˜− q¯ is equal to the sign of
p1A(βˆ − β1)(d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ)− p1A(βˆ − β0)(d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ − p1β1)
= p1A(β0 − β1)(d+ u¯+ p1Aβˆ) + p21A(βˆ − β0)β1 > 0,
and hence q¯ < q˜ < 1. Furthermore, q¯ < 0 if and only if βˆ < β0 or
p1 >
αλ
1 + αλ
(11)
holds. Therefore if p1 > αλ/(1 + αλ), then cS < cUI always holds, and if
p1 ≤ αλ/(1 + αλ), then cS < cUI if and only if q > q¯.
The analysis given above leads to the conclusion of Proposition 3. (Q.E.D.)
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